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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

GUARDIAN STATE BANK, a
Utah corporation,

]
I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 20158

vs.
F.C. STANGL I I I ,
Defendant and
Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant Guardian State Bank ("Guardian") filed this action to
recover the amount due from Respondent F.C. Stangl ("Stangl") on a
Promissory Note executed in favor of Guardian dated May 11, 1981, and for
fraud and declaratory relief.

Stangl admitted l i a b i l i t y on that Note but

filed a Counterclaim seeking to recover from Guardian on Guardian's
indorsement of a previous Promissory Note which Stangl had guaranteed. A
Third-Party Complaint filed by Guardian against its attorneys for negligence
in the subject transaction is not involved in this Appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court granted Stangl's Motion for a directed verdict.
Judgment was thereafter entered by the Court on June 19, 1984.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Guardian seeks an Order reversing the Judgment below in favor of
Stangl on his Counterclaim with directions to enter Judgment on the
Counterclaim in favor of Guardian, and awarding Guardian its attorneys1 fees
and costs incurred in the Court below and on Appeal.

In the alternative,

Guardian seeks an Order reversing the Judgment and remanding the case for a
new t r i a l .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Preliminary Statement.

The directed verdict in favor of Stangl was only proper i f , as a
matter of law, reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be
determined from the evidence presented at t r i a l so that Stangl was entitled
to Judgment as a matter of law.

The District Court was not free to weigh

the evidence in deciding the Motion for Directed Verdict and was obligated
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Guardian.

See, e.g.,

Management Committee of Greystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Graystone
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 513 P.2d 432
(Utah 1973).
Most of the facts set forth below are undisputed.

In those

instances where the facts are in dispute, the facts presented by Guardian
are set forth in accordance with the foregoing standards and Stangl1s
conflicting testimony is set forth in footnotes.
B.

Facts.

At all relevant times Stangl was an officer, director and 50%
shareholder in Sargetis Fine Cars, Inc. (the "dealership"), which owned and

operated a car dealership in Price, Utah.
dealership was John Sargetis ("Sargetis").

The other principal of the
Stangl also owned the property

upon which the dealership conducted i t s business and leased that property to
the dealership. [R. 341; 604, l i n e 24 - 605, line 1]
On or about August 28, 1979, the dealership obtained a loan in the
principal sum of $150,000.00 from Empire State Bank, which was the
predecessor-in-interest to Guardian.

To evidence that loan, the

dealership executed a Promissory Note (the "original Note") in favor of
Guardian in the total principal sum of $150,000.00, bearing interest at the
rate of 1.5% above Chase Manhattan Bank prime, payable upon demand. [Ex.
D-l; R. 341; 558, lines 17-25]

As a condition of making the subject loan,

both Stangl and Sargetis individually were required to and did execute a
continuing Guaranty of a l l the debts and obligations owing to Guardian by
the dealership. [Ex. D-2; 341, 560, lines 11-24]

Stangl understood at the

time he executed the Guaranty that i f the dealership did not pay the
original Note, he was obligated to do so. [R. 606, lines 5-8]
The dealership subsequently went out of business, and in December
1980, assigned i t s remaining assets to the National Association of Credit
Men ("N.A.C.M.") for liquidation as a Trustee for the benefit of creditors.
[R. 653, lines 6-11]
As of April 1981, no principal payments had been made on the
original Note for approximately one year. [R. 702, l i n e 23 - 703, l i n e 3 ] .
In April 1981, Russell Webb, who was then the newly installed President of
Guardian, met with Stangl at Guardian's offices to discuss the delinquent

1

Empire was merged into Guardian in April 1982 [R. 338] and both
entities w i l l hereinafter be referred to as "Guardian".

_^«

loan and told Stangl that Stangl, as a Guarantor, would have to pay the
original Note.

Stangl was very cooperative at the meeting and agreed that

he had a responsibility to pay the original Note.

However, Stangl

represented that he was not in a position to pay the f u l l amount of the Note
at that time and requested a repayment program whereby Stangl would execute
a new Promissory Note payable one-half within sixty or ninety days and the
other half within another year. [R. 555, lines 20-23; 561, l i n e 19 - 562,
line 10]

Stangl told Mr. Webb he was concerned that by paying o f f the Note

he would lose his right to get any recovery from the assets of the
dealership being liquidated by the N.A.C.M. [R. 626, lines 19-25]

Stangl

also told Mr. Webb that he wanted Guardian to give him the original Note and
Guaranty so that he could attempt to collect from the assets of the
dealership and from Sargetis individually. [R. 510, lines 1-5; 601, Lines
6-10]

These terms were agreed to by Mr. Webb. [R. 628, lines 1-7]

Stangl

did not t e l l Mr. Webb that he wanted Guardian to indorse the original Note
to him so that he could impose l i a b i l i t y on Guardian. [R. 514, lines 11-20;
600, Line 25 - 601, l i n e 10]

I f Stangl would have told Mr. Webb that he

would seek to impose l i a b i l i t y upon Guardian on the original Note, Guardian
would, of course, not have entered into the transaction. [R. 573, lines 14 574, l i n e l l ] 2
Although a l l of the terms with respect to the repayment of the
original Note were agreed to by Mr. Webb and Stangl d i r e c t l y , Jerry

2

Stangl did not contradict this testimony except to contend that during
the meeting he had i n i t i a l l y objected to paying the original Note
principally because he thought the Note was to be amortized over five
years instead of payable on demand. Stangl specifically acknowledged
that an agreement had been reached concerning repayment in his meeting
with Mr. Webb and that he told Mr. Webb he wanted the Note and
Guaranty to try to collect from the dealership. [R. 90, line 21 - 93,
l i n e 76; 101, lines 4-13]
-A-

Dearinger ("Dearinger"), the lawyer for Guardian, and Bruce Maak ("Maak"),
the lawyer for Stangl, were to document the transaction to conform to the
agreement reached between Stangl and Guardian. [R. 567, line 22 - 568, line
6; 629, lines 16-24; 674, lines 17-22]
Dearinger and Maak subsequently did undertake to document the
agreement.

Dearinger testified that in his conversations with Maak, Maak

told him that although he had advised Stangl that he thought Stangl had some
unspecified defenses on the Guaranty, Stangl wanted to go ahead and make
payment to Guardian on his Guaranty.

Maak also told Mr. Dearinger that

Stangl wanted to protect his good credit in town so he was willing to pay
the Guaranty, but didn't have the funds to pay i t at that moment, so i f
transaction was structured so that Stangl could pay the Guaranty over a
period of time, Stangl would be willing to pay the Guaranty.

Maak told

Dearinger that i f Stangl paid the loan, he should be assigned Guardian's
rights against the dealership and Sargetis upon the original Note and
Guaranty, and that the only reason Stangl wanted the original Note and
Guaranty was so that Stangl could pursue John Sargetis and the dealership.
[R. 640, line 25 - 642, line 1 ; 645, lines 1-6]

Maak told Dearinger that he

wanted the transaction structured as a purchase of the original Note with a
new Note to make i t clear the original Note was not being paid off,
consistent with Stangl's concern that by paying the Note he would forfeit
any right to recover dealership assets from the N.A.C.M. [R. 670, lines
4-10] 3

3

Although Maak denied that he ever told Dearinger that the only reason
Stangl wanted the original Note and Guaranty was to pursue Sargetis
and the dealership, he acknowledged that he might have told Dearinger
that was one of the reasons. [R. 686, lines 8-13] Maak also
acknowledged that he never told Dearinger or Guardian that the reason
he wanted the original Note and Guaranty in the form he required was
so that Stangl could hold Guardian liable on its indorsement and
escape l i a b i l i t y to Guardian. [R. 150, lines 18 - 151, line 7]
-5-

While Stangl intentionally led Guardian to believe that he intended
to pay his obligation to the Bank on the Guaranty by executing a new
Promissory Note which would give Stangl additional time for the payment of
the obligation, Stangl and his attorney in fact had no such intent.

Rather,

Stangl intended to attempt to evade any obligation to Guardian on the
Guaranty or the new Note by getting Guardian to indorse the original Note
with recourse, transfer the original Note and Guaranty to Stangl, and then
hold Guardian liable on its indorsement i f the amount of the original Note
could not be collected from the dealership. [R. 711, line 22 - 712, line 1 ;
671, line 18 - 672, line 6; 695, lines 7-14; 691, lines 6-19; 637, lines
8-15]
To carry out this scheme, on May 14, 1981, Stangl paid interest
current on the original Note in the sum of $8,104.00 and executed a new
Promissory Note in favor of Guardian in the principal sum of $132,000.00,
representing the unpaid principal balance of the original Note.

The new

Note provided for interest at the rate of ^% above Chase Manhattan Bank
prime (one-half percent less than the original Note) and was to be repaid in
two equal installments on or before July 10, 1981 and July 10, 1982. The
new Note recited i t was given for the purchase of the original Note. [Ex.
P-10; R. 342; 632, lines 2-8]

Pursuant to the agreement of the parties,

Guardian at that time also assigned and delivered to Stangl the Guaranty of
the original Note which Stangl and Sargetis had executed, and the original
Note itself which was indorsed by Guardian.

Guardian's indorsement did not

contain any indication on its face that i t was without recourse. [Exs. D-1 &
D-2; R. 342]

Immediately upon completing this transaction, i t was Stangl's

position that he had no further l i a b i l i t y to Guardian, which was the result

he intended the transaction to accomplish. [R. 637, lines 8-15; 711, line 22
- 712, line 1]

Of Course, this position was not communicated to Guardian.

After Stangl executed the new Promissory Note and acquired the
original Note and Guaranty from Guardian, Stangl claims to have made some
minimal efforts to collect the original Note from the assets of the
dealership and from Sargetis individually.

However, no funds were ever

collected and Stangl never made any payments on the new Note. [R. 680, line
10 - 681, line 3; 712, lines 15-17]

By the Fall of 1981, Stangl undeniably

knew that the original Note could not be collected from the dealership
because Ford Motor Credit had a perfected security interest in all of the
assets of the dealership. [R. 682, lines 10-21]

Nevertheless, Stangl made

no demand upon Guardian for payment of the original Note until approximately
one year later in September, 1982 in response to a demand by Guardian for
payment of the new Promissory Note. [R. 342]
Guardian then commenced this action in the Fall of 1982, seeking to
recover the amount owing from Stangl on the new Promissory Note.

Guardian

also sought recovery for fraud based on Stangl's misrepresentations and
omissions which induced Guardian to indorse the original Note and assign the
Guaranty to Stangl.

Finally, Guardian sought declaratory relief with

respect to the rights of the parties on the original Note and Guaranty. [R.
2-6]

Stangl answered the Complaint admitting l i a b i l i t y on the new Note, and

filed a Counter-claim seeking to recover from Guardian on Guardian's
indorsement of the original Note in an amount in excess of that which was
owed to Guardian on the new Note. [R 10-16]
Some months after the action was f i l e d , Guardian was granted leave
to f i l e a Third-Party Complaint against its attorneys in the transaction

-7-

with Stangl, Jerry Dearinger and the firm of Kirton & McConkie.

Guardian

sought recovery from the Third-Party Defendants on the basis that i f Stangl
was entitled to recover from Guardian on its indorsement of the original
Note, the Third-Party Defendants were liable to Guardian for negligence. [R.
101-105]
The case went to trial before a Jury on May 21 - 23, 1984.

After

Guardian and Stangl had rested their cases as against each other, Stangl
moved for a directed verdict on the basis that as a matter of law Guardian
was indebted to Stangl on the original Note in an amount in excess of
Stangl1s l i a b i l i t y to Guardian on the new Note. [R. 727, line 12; 728, line
17]

Guardian also moved for a directed verdict. [R. 751, lines 14-20]

Although the District Court believed that the result was "so grossly
unfair", the Court did not feel that there was any legal basis upon which to
grant relief to Guardian and granted Stangl's Motion for Directed Verdict.
[R. 759, line 23 - 760, line 6]
The action between Guardian and the Third-Party Defendants was then
submitted to the jury, which determined that the Third-Party Defendants had
been 55% negligent with respect to the transaction, that Guardian had been
45% negligent and that Guardian's damages were $202,021.00. [R. 406-409]
Thereafter, on June 19, 1984, the Court entered its Judgment in
favor of Stangl in the net amount of $2,001.69, together with interest and
in favor of Guardian against the Third-Party Defendants in accordance with
the jury's verdict in the sum of $106,711.55. [R. 439-441]

No appeal has

been filed with respect to the portion of the Judgment in favor of Guardian
and against Third-Party Defendants, and that portion of the Judgment has
been paid.

-8-

Based upon the foregoing facts and for the reasons hereinafter set
f o r t h , i t is respectfully submitted that the D i s t r i c t Court's conclusion
that i t could not deny Stangl the f r u i t s of his well-devised charade was in
error.

Guardian submits that i t is e n t i t l e d to Judgment as a matter of law,

or a t the yery least to a new t r i a l .
ARGUMENT
I.

EVEN IF GUARDIAN'S INDORSEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE IS VALID,

GUARDIAN IS NOT LIABLE TO STANGL.
Under Section I I of this Brief we demonstrate that Guardian's
indorsement of the original Note is invalid and unenforceable by Stangl for
a number of reasons.

However, even i f i t is assumed for purposes of

argument that the indorsement is enforceable, Guardian has no l i a b i l i t y to
Stangl on the original Note for the reasons set forth below.
A.

Guardian is Entitled to be Subrogated to All Rights of

Stangl Under the Original Note and Guaranty.
Stangl's position in this lawsuit is that because Guardian's
indorsement of the original Note did not recite on i t s face that i t was
"without recourse" Guardian is l i a b l e for the f u l l amount of that Note as a
matter of law.

Assuming for purposes of argument that the D i s t r i c t Court

was correct in determining that Guardian is l i a b l e to Stangl on Guardian's
indorsement of the original Note, Guardian is e n t i t l e d as a matter of law to
be subrogated to a l l of Stangl's rights with respect to the indebtedness
which is the subject of the original Note.

Guardian's right of subrogation

includes the right to recover from both Stangl and Sargetis on the

-9-

continuing Guaranty of that indebtedness which they executed.

Consequently,

any l i a b i l i t y of Guardian on the original Note is offset by Stangl's
l i a b i l i t y to Guardian on the Guaranty of that Note.
Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code an indorser is a type of
surety.

See, e . g . , First New Haven National Bank v. Clarke, 368 A.2d 613,

614 (Conn. 1976) ("more than that of any other party to commercial paper,
the indorser1 s l i a b i l i t y is like that of a surety."); 2 Hart & Miller,
Commercial Paper Under the U.C.C, (1984); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code, p. 426 (1980); Wladis, U.C.C. Art. 3 Suretyship and the
Holder In Due Course: Requiem for Good Samaritan, 70 Georgetown Law Journal
975, 979 (1982); Noble, The Surety and Article 3: A New Identity For an Old
Friend, 19 Duquesne Law Review 245, 261 (1981); U.C.C Sec. 3-606 Comment 5
("the suretyship defense stated has been generally recognized as available
to indorsers or accommodation parties.")
I t has long been the law in this Country, both before and after
the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted, that once an indorser, surety or
accommodation party pays a note he stands in the shoes of the creditor and
is subrogated to all of the creditor's rights not only on the note but on
the underlying obligation.

For example, in N. J. Gendron Lumber v. Great

Northern Homes, 395 N.E.2d 457 (Mass. 1979), the Court held that an indorser
who had paid a promissory note could not only recover against the maker but
against a guarantor of the obligation represented by the Note.

See also,

Halpin v. Fankenberger, 644 P.2d 452 (Kan. 1982); Reimann v. Hybertsen, 550
P.2d 436 (Ore. 1976); Simpson v. Bilderbeck, Inc., 417 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1966);
Alavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Development Co., 371 So.2d 755 (La.
1979); Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. McGraw, 259 N.W. 507 (1935);
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Miami Mortgage & Guaranty Co. v. Drawdy, 127 So. 323 (Fla. 1930); Northern
Bank & Trust Co. v. Slater, Walt & Co., 212 P. 1063 (Wash. 1923); Wallace v.
Jones, 72 A. 769 (Md. 1909); Hartzell v. McClurg, 74 N.W. 626 (Neb. 1898);
The Surety and Article 3: A New Identity For an Old Friend, 19 Duquesne Law
Review 245, 261 (1981); Simpson on Suretyship, Sec. 47 (1950); U.C.C. Sec.
3-606, Comment 1 (recognizing that a surety has a "right of recourse either
on the instrument or dehors i t . " )
The right of an indorser upon payment of a note to all of the
creditor 1 s rights in the note and the underlying obligation is simply one
application of the principle of equitable subrogation.

That principle is

not displaced by the Code, but supplements its provisions.
Annotated, Sec. 70A-1-103.

Utah Code

The purpose of subrogation was set forth by this

Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (lit. 1980) as
follows:
"Subrogation is a creature of equity, its purpose is to
work out an equitable adjustment between the parties by
securing the ultimate discharge of a debt by the person
who, in equity and in good conscience ought to pay i t . "
Another author describes the principle as follows:
"Upon his payment of the principal's debt, the surety has
the right to be substituted to the position of the creditor
whom he pays. This is known as the surety's right of
subrogation. Whether or not the surety upon payment has
taken an assignment from the creditor of the latter 1 s
rights, equity will treat him as an assignee. Subrogation
is equitable assignment. . . . Subrogation entitles the
surety to use any remedy against the principal which the
creditor could have used, and in general to enjoy the
benefit of any advantage that the creditor had, such as
. . . to proceed against a third person who has promised
eitherThe principal or the creditor to pay the debt."
Simpson on Suretyship, supra., at p. 205. [Emphasis added]
Similarly, in Moyer v. Colyer, 283 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1955), the
Court observed:
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"What rights did the sureties have upon payment of the note
in question? As a general rule where a b i l l or note has
been paid by a party who is only secondarily liable, the
party paying will be subrogated to all rights and remedies
which were available to the holder or owner of the
instrument in order to obtain payment thereof." (Id. at
818)
In the present case, Stangl was clearly a primary obligor on
the debt pursuant to his written Guaranty.

See, Ex. D-2; Strevell-Paterson

Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Ut. 1982).

The evidence produced by

Stangl in the Court below did not even approach raising any defense to the
Guaranty.

The only purported defense raised by Stangl was that sometime

after the August 1979 transaction in which he signed the guaranty, he was
told that the original Note would be amortized over five years when, in
fact, the Note was payable on demand.

I t is totally irrelevant what Stangl

was told after he had already obligated himself on the Guaranty. More
importantly, even i f the original Note had been payable in installments over
a period of five years, the evidence was undisputed that the installments
were not paid and in fact no principal had been paid on the original Note
for a year before demand was made on Stangl on his Guaranty.

Therefore,

Guardian legally had the right to accelerate the original Note pursuant to
the acceleration provision contained therein and demand payment in f u l l .
Kixx, Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385 (Ut. 1980); Commercial
Security Bank v. Corporation Nine, 600 P.2d 1000 (Ut. 1979).
Consequently, even i f Guardian is liable as an indorser of the
original Note, Guardian is subrogated to all Stangl's rights in the original
Note and Guaranty and is entitled to collect the full amount of the original
Note from Stangl based on the Guaranty.
each other as a matter of law.
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The l i a b i l i t i e s , therefore, offset

B.

Any Liability of Guardian on its Indorsement Was Discharged

When Stangl Acquired the Original Note.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-208 provides:
"Where an instrument is returned to or re-acquired
by a prior party . . .any intervening party is
discharged as against the re-acquiring party, and
subsequent holders not in due course . . . "
Pursuant to this statute, where a prior party to a Promissory Note
re-acquires the Note, a subsequent indorser is discharged.

Hewett v. Marine

Midland Bank, 449 NYS2d 745 (1982); Cop!an Pipe & Supply Co. v. Ben-Frieda
Corp., 256 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1972).
The courts are divided on the issue of whether one who signs a
separate guaranty of a Promissory Note, as Stangl did in this case, is a
"party" to that Note for the purposes of Article 3 of the Commercial Code.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the better reasoned cases have
held that one who signs a separate guaranty of a Promissory Note is, as to
the immediate parties to the transaction, a party to that Note. See, e.g.,
Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 645 S.W.2d 17 (Miss. 1982); Provident
Bank v. Gast, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (Ohio 1979).

Thus, in Commerce Bank of St.

Louis, supra., the Court observed that there was "no logical reason" not to
treat a guarantor who signed a separate document guaranteeing a Promissory
Note as a party to that Promissory Note and concluded:
"The defendant guarantors were parties to the instrument
even though their guaranty was a separate document, or
dehors the note itself, since they were known participants
in the loan/stock purchase transaction of which the note
and guaranty were contemporaneous, integrated events."
[645 S.W.2d at 21] [Emphasis added]

4

Insofar as Guardian can determine, this Court has never decided the
issue.
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As between the obligors on a negotiable instrument and their
immediate obligee, the terms of the instrument must be interpreted together
with any other agreements executed as part of the same transaction.
Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-119(l).

Utah

The Commercial Code recognizes that as

between the immediate parties a negotiable instrument is merely a contract,
that ordinary contract principles apply and that the courts will look to the
entire agreement between the parties to ascertain their rights and
obligations.

Se£, U.C.C., Sec. 3-119, Comment 3; Gensplit Finance Corp., v.

Link Power and Machinery Corp., 36 U.C.C. Reporting Service 588 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
For example, in Gensplit Finance Corp., Plaintiff sought recovery
based upon Defendant's unrestricted indorsement of two Promissory Notes.
The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that
parole evidence was admissible to show that the Notes were indorsed pursuant
to a separate agreement between the parties which severely limited
Defendant's l i a b i l i t y , stating:
"It is well established that, as between immediate parties,
a negotiable instrument—or, indeed, its indorsement—is
merely a contract . . . which purpose the court must
attempt to carry out. As between these two parties, the
purpose should not be drawn merely from the indorsement on
the Veko notes. Before us is a transferree who seeks full
recovery against its immediate transferor by inviting our
attention only to two documents on the grounds they are
promissory notes. . . . [W]e decline this invitation, and,
thus deny plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment." [36
U.C.C. Reporting Service at 593-594] [Emphasis added]
As between the immediate parties to the original Note in this
case, there simply is no logical reason why Stangl's rights and obligations
should hinge on the question of which piece of paper he signed his
guaranty.

Both the original Note and Guaranty must be read together in
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determining the rights and obligations of the parties.

Stangl's l i a b i l i t y

for payment of the original Note to Guardian was the same as i f he had
signed his name on the back of the original Note with the words "payment
guaranteed".

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-416(l) and (5); Strevell

Patterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982); Hopkins v. F i r s t
National Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Texas 1977).

In either event, Stangl would

have been an original obligor on the indebtedness represented by that
Promissory Note. Rice v. Traveler's Express Co., 407 S.W.2d 534 (Texas
5
1966).
Therefore, Stangl should be treated no differently than i f his
guaranty was contained on the Note i t s e l f .

Viewed in t h i s manner, Stangl f s

reacquisition of the Note discharged Guardian's l i a b i l i t y as a subsequent
indorser as a matter of law under the authorities cited above.
Finally, even i f this Court chooses not to follow those cases
which have held one who signs a separate guaranty to be a technical party to
the Promissory Note, i t is nevertheless submitted that the same rationale
under which a prior party to a Promissory Note is not l i a b l e to a subsequent
party applies in this case to prevent Stangl from charging Guardian with
l i a b i l i t y on i t s indorsement.

Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-414,

indorsers are l i a b l e to one another in the order in which they indorse a
Promissory Note which is presumed to be the order in which t h e i r signatures
appear on the Note.

The rationale of Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-3-208

quoted above is that since a prior party on a Note is l i a b l e to the

5

In f a c t , Stangl's l i a b i l i t y to Guardian was no different that i f he
had been a co-maker of the Note. In t h i s regard, where a co-maker
pays and reacquires a Note, l i a b i l i t y of a l l persons on the Note is
discharged. Bourg v. Wiley, 398 S.2d 13 (La. 1981).
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subsequent indorser, the prior party should not be able to improve his
position by acquiring the Note and then seeking to impose l i a b i l i t y on the
subsequent indorser.

U.C.C. Sec. 3-208, Comment 1.

In the case at bar,

prior to acquiring the original Note, Stangl was clearly liable to Guardian
for payment of the Note.

Stangl should not be allowed to improve his

position as against Guardian by acquiring the Note.
C.

An Accommodation Party is Not Liable to the Party

Accommodated.
Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-415(5), an accommodation
party is not liable to the party accommodated.

In the present case,

Guardian was merely an accommodation indorser because Guardian indorsed the
original Note solely to allow Stangl to attempt to collect against the
maker.

As against Stangl, i t is clear that parole evidence is admissible to

prove Guardian indorsed for accommodation only.

Utah Code Annotated, Sec.

70A-3-415(3); U.C.C. Sec. 3-415, Comment 1.
Gibbs Hoy! Co. v. Collentro and Collentro, Inc., 252 N.E.2d 217
(Mass. 1969) is closely on point.
sought to recover from an indorser.

In Gibbs, the payee on a Promissory Note
The indorser presented parole evidence

that he had only indorsed the Note to enable the payee to discount the
Note.

The court held that the indorser was not liable because an

accommodation indorser is not liable to the party accommodated.

See, also,

Deems v. Wilson, 151 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. 1966); United Refrigerator v.
Applebaum, 189 A.2d 253 (Penn. 1963); Gensplit Finance Corp. v. Link Power
and Machinery Corp., supra.
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Stangl undeniably knew that Guardian only indorsed the original
Note to enable Stangl to collect from the dealership and Sargetis.
Guardian is e n t i t l e d to Judgment as a matter of law.

Hence,

And, even i f some

factual issue exists as to whether Guardian was an accommodation indorser,
the D i s t r i c t Court clearly erred in not submitting the question to the Jury.
II.

GUARDIAN'S INDORSEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE IS INVALID AND

UNENFORCEABLE.
Even i f , contrary to what is argued above, Guardian's indorsement
of the original Note, on i t s face, rendered Guardian l i a b l e to Stangl, that
indorsement is invalid and unenforceable by Stangl because: (a) Guardian was
fraudulently induced to indorse the original Note; (b) the original Note and
Guaranty were only delivered to Stangl for the special purpose of collecting
against the dealership and Sargetis; (c) Guardian indorsed the original Note
and assigned the Guaranty based upon a mistake of fact induced and known by
Stangl; (d) Stangl gave no consideration to Guardian to acquire the original
note and Guaranty; and (e) Stangl did not act in good f a i t h in the
transaction.

The D i s t r i c t Court should have directed a verdict for Guardian

on these issues, or, at the very l e a s t , should have submitted these issues
to the Jury.
At the outset, i t should be noted that the parties stipulated below
that Stangl was not a holder in Due Course of the original Note.

Thus, any

defense that is a defense to a simple contract constitutes a defense to
Stangl's enforcement of Guardian's indorsement of that Note.
Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-306.
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Utah Code

A.

Guardian Was Defrauded Into Delivering the Original Note

and Guaranty to Stangl.
The evidence was undisputed in the Court below that the
original Note and Guaranty were transferred to Stangl in reliance upon his
representation that he simply wanted all of Guardian's rights in the
original Note and Guaranty to attempt collection from the dealership and
Sargetis.

Contrary to what Guardian was intentionally led to believe,

Stangl's admitted intent throughout the transaction was to evade l i a b i l i t y
to Guardian by obtaining Guardian's indorsement on the original Note and
holding Guardian liable on that indorsement.

The evidence was also

undisputed that Stangl had no intention of paying the new Note of May 11,
1981 at the time he executed the new Note unless and until he collected the
original Note.
1.

Misrepresentation concerning purpose of acquiring

original Note and Guaranty.
The Utah Supreme Court case of Berkeley Bank For Co-ops v.
Meibose, 607 P.2d 798 (Ut. 1980), is similar to the case at bar.

In

Berkeley, this Court held that Defendants were not liable on promissory
notes which they had executed because the purpose of those notes had been
misrepresented.

In so holding, this Court observed:

" . . . A statement of future intention is actionable i f a
fraudulent intention existed at the time the deceitful
statement was made, [citations omitted] In the instant
case the jury found the necessary fraudulent intent at the
time that representations as to future conduct were made by
the defendant.
. . .

" I t can hardly be maintained that the general moral
level of business and other financial relationships would
be enhanced by a rule of law which would allow a person to
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defend against a w i l l f u l , deliberate fraud by stating, 'you
should not have trusted or believed me1 or 'had you not
been so gullible you would not have been [so] deceived.1
[citations omitted] The rules governing fraud should
foster intercourse based on trust, forthrightness, and
honesty." (jd^ at 805.)
In the Court below, Stangl argued that no cause of action
for fraud existed because Stangl had never expressly told Guardian that he
would not seek to impose l i a b i l i y on Guardian by virtue of its indorsement
and that Stangl had no duty to affirmatively disclose that such was his
intention.

This argument is not in accord with the law.

Once Stangl

undertook to t e l l Guardian why he wanted the original Note and Guaranty, he
was obligated to tell Guardian the whole truth and not to mislead or deceive
Guardian by omitting material facts.

See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray,

Inc., 212 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1968); Daive v. American Universal Insurance Co.,
417 A.2d 2 (N.H. 1980); Heise v. Pilot Rock Lumber Co., 352 P.2d 1072 (Ore.
1960); Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1972).
This principle was recognized by the court in Heise v.
Pilot Rock Lumber Co., supra., at p. 1078, where the Court stated:
"'Though a buyer is not bound to answer a seller f s
inquiries relative to the property being purchased and
sold, in the absence of special circumstances, yet i f he
does answer, he must answer truthfully, [citations
omitted] He must make a full and fair disclosure and not
conceal pertinent or material information. . . .
. . .
" . . . 'Fraud may be predicated upon an equivocal,
evasive, or misleading answer calculated to convey a false
impression even though i t may be l i t e r a l l y true as far as
i t goes. A partial and fragmentary disclosure accompanied
by willful concealment of material and qualifying facts is
not a true statement and is often as much a fraud as an
actual representation.1"
Similarly, in Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper,
supra., at p. 880, the Court observed:
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" ' I t Is certainly true that any active conduct or words
which tend to produce an erroneous Impression may amount to
fraud, and half the truth may be a l i e In effect.
"Even when a party Is under no duty to speak regarding a
matter, i f he does speak, he must speak the truth and make
a full and f a i r disclosure.
• • •

"If in addition to the party's silence there is any
statement, even any word or act on his part, which tends
affirmatively to a~ suppression of the truth, to a covering
up or disguising the truth, or to a withdrawal or
distraction of the other party's attention or observation
from the real facts, then the line is overstepped, and the
concealment becomes fraudulent. 1 " [Emphasis addedj
Stangl's admitted purpose in seeking to obtain the original
Note and Guaranty was to totally escape any l i a b i l i t y on his Guaranty. He
suppressed this fact from Guardian and disguised his real intent for one
obvious reason:

Stangl knew i f he told Guardian the true reason he wanted

the original Note and Guaranty, Guardian would never have agreed to the
transaction and would have immediately sued him on his Guaranty.

Although

Stangl's scheme was undeniably clever, i t was nevertheless fraudulent.
2.

Misrepresentation of intent to pay the new May 11, 1981

Note.
Stangl also fraudulently induced Guardian to indorse the
original Note and assign the Guaranty to him by Stangl's fraudulent conduct
in executing the new Note of May 11, 1981.
By executing the new Note, Stangl unconditionally promised
to pay Guardian $132,000.00 together with interest, payable in two
installments on or before July 10, 1981 and July 10, 1982.

Contrary to the

promise contained in the new Note, Stangl in fact admittedly had no
intention whatsoever of paying any portion of that Note unless, until and
only to the extent he collected the original Note.

While intentionally

leading Guardian to believe that he intended to honor his obligation on the
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Guaranty by paying the new Note, Stangl in fact made the promise contained
in the new Note simply as part of his well disguised charade aimed at
evading his legal obligation on his Guaranty.

Stangl's scheme of promising

to pay the new Note when he had absolutely no intention of performing that
promise constituted clear, palpable fraud on his part.

Berkeley Bank for

Co-ops v. Meibose, supra.; Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1978).
B.

The Original Note and Guaranty Were Only Delivered to

Stangl to Allow Him to Attempt Collection Against the Other Parties.
Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-306, Guardian is not
liable to Stangl on the indorsement of the original Note i f , as Guardian
contends, that Note was only given to Stangl for the special purpose of
enabling Stangl to attempt to collect from the dealership and Sargetis.
That special purpose may be proven by parole evidence.

Berkeley Bank for

Co-ops v. Meibos, supra; Ventures, Inc. v. Jones, 623 P.2d 145 (Ida. 1981).
Thus, in the Ventures, Inc. case, the Court held that
Defendants were not liable on certain promissory notes because there had
been an oral agreement that the notes were simply given as additional
interim security for an underlying debt and that the notes would only be in
effect until a second mortgage was substituted on the property.

In reaching

this conclusion, the Court observed:
"Post-UCC cases interpreting Chapter 3 have generally held
that one not a holder in due course takes a note subject to
the defense that delivery was for a special purpose only
and that proof of such delivery pursuant to an alleged
collateral agreement is not precluded by the parole
evidence rule, [citations omitted]" (Id. at 149)
Similarly, in American Under. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr.
Co., 303 A.2d 121 (R.I. 1973), the Court held the Defendant bank was not
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liable on its unrestricted indorsement of a draft because the draft had only
been delivered for a special purpose, which purpose could be proven by
parole evidence.
The undisputed evidence presented by Guardian in the Court
below compels the conclusion the original Note was only delivered to Stangl
to allow him to pursue collection from the other parties liable.

Indeed,

unless the agreement between the parties is so interpreted, the agreement
was an absurdity in that Guardian released Stangl from an indebtedness of
$132,000 and agreed to affirmatively be liable to Stangl for substantial
sums.

In this regard, where there is a choice, a contract should be

interpreted to bring about an equitable result rather than a harsh or
inequitable one.

Wingets Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Ut. 1972).

Further, an interpretation of a contract which renders the contract an
absurdity or illusory should be avoided.

Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v.

DeLorean, 640 P.2d 343 (Kan. 1982); Marathon Steel Co. v. Tilley Steel,
Inc., 136 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1977).

Finally, the l i t e r a l terms of a contract may

be qualified by the context, purpose and circumstances of the contract to
make i t a rational instrument.

Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc. v. Mass.

Port Authority, 387 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1979).
C.

Guardian's Indorsement Should Be Reformed or Rescinded

Because of Mistake of Fact.
Guardian indorsed the original Note because i t was under the
belief that Stangl was agreeing to pay his obligation under the Guaranty and
was only getting the original Note and Guaranty in order to attempt to
collect the same from the dealership and Sargetis.
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Stangl knew of

Guardian's mistaken belief and in fact Stangl induced that belief.
Consequently, Guardian's indorsement should be reformed so that the
indorsement is "without recourse" or, at the very least, Guardian's
indorsement should be rescinded.
I t is well-settled in Utah that a party to a contract is
entitled to reformation of the contract where the contract does not in fact
correctly embody the oral agreement of the parties, the complaining party
entered into the contract based upon unilateral mistake and the other parly
engaged in inequitable conduct.

Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Ut. 1980);

McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 502 (Ut. 1952); Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d
769 (Ut. 1951).

I t is respectfully submitted that reformation is most

appropriate in this case.

Stangl represented he simply wanted the original

Note to go after the dealership and Sargetis, Guardian agreed to give him
the original Note for that purpose and Stangl knew that was the agreement
Guardian intended to enter into with him.

Under such circumstances, Stangl

should be held to that agreement.
The circumstances under which the unilateral mistake of one
party to a contract can form the basis for rescission of that contract were
discussed by this Court in the recent case of Tolboe Construction Co. v.
Staker Paving & Construction Co,, 682 P.2d 843 (Ut. 1984).

There, the

Defendant had submitted a paving bid which was substantially lower than any
of the other bids received by Plaintiff.

After receiving the bid, the

Plaintiff called Defendant, told Defendant the bid was low and that
Defendant should review the bid.

Defendant subsequently re-examined its

calculations and reconfinned the bid to Plaintiff.

Nevertheless, this Court

held that the Plaintiff could not enforce the bid against Defendant, stating:
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"'[Knowledge by one party that the other Is acting under
mistake Is treated as equivalent to mutual mistake for
purposes of rescission. 1 [citations omitted] Relief from
mistaken bids is consistently allowed when one party knows
or has reason to know of the other's error and the
requirements for rescission are f u l f i l l e d .
"Likewise, under the latter doctrine (palpable mistake),
i f the offeree caused, knew of, should have known of or had
reason to know of the offerer's mistake, the mistake is
'palpable1 and as such may be rescinded by the offerer."
(Id. at 846)
The Tolboe Court went on to note that, "where an offer is so inconsistent
with the true value of the bargain that a reasonable person would know the
offerer made a mistake in his evaluation" then offeree should be charged
with knowledge of the mistake.

To the same effect, see Ashworth v.

Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724 (Ut. 1951); Puget Sound National Bank v.
Selivanoff, 514 P.2d 175 (Wash. 1973); 13 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1548
(3rd Ed. 1970); Restatement of Contracts 2d, Sec. 153.
In arguing the Motion for Directed Verdict, Stangl contended for
the f i r s t time that Guardian was not entitled to equitable relief on the
basis of mistake because by suing on the new Note Guardian had elected its
remedy.

I t is respectfully submitted this contention is without merit.
In the f i r s t place, Guardian sought declaratory relief as to the

rights and l i a b i l i t i e s of the parties on the original Note.

In deciding the

declaratory relief cause of action the Court was required to achieve
complete justice between the parties even i f that meant granting relief not
specifically prayed for by a party.

Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of

Guide Dogs, 432 P.2d 717, 721 (Cal. 1967).

A request for declaratory relief

is equitable in nature and a Court is authorized to grant any equitable
relief, such as reformation or rescission, even i f not specifically
requested.

Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 422 P.2d 840,

844 (Okla. 1966); Benton v. Benton, 528 P.2d 1244 (Kan. 1974).
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Second, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
Court is empowered to grant any relief to which a party is entitled based on
the evidence and is not limited by the prayer of the Complaint.

Pope v.

Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Ut. 1978); Palombi v. D & C Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Ut.
1969); Smith v. Zepp, 567 P.2d 923 (Mont. 1977).

Specifically, a Court may

grant equitable relief such as reformation or rescission where appropriate
even though damages have been sought.

cjF, Garland v. Garland, 165 F.2d 131

(10th Cir. 1948).
D.

Stangl Gave No Consideration for Guardian's Indorsement of the

Original Note.
Stangl cannot impose l i a b i l i t y upon Guardian on its indorsement of
the original Note because Stangl gave no consideration to Guardian for the
original Note and Guaranty.

As of the time he received the original Note

and Guaranty, Stangl was absolutely obligated to Guardian to pay the debt by
virtue of his Guaranty.

Consequently, Stangl1 s execution of the new Note

whereby he promised to pay the debt in the future, rather than immediately
as he was obligated to do under the Guaranty, did not constitute
consideration for Guardian's indorsement of the Note.
For example, in Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Ut. 1974), this
Court held that the Defendant's promise to pay three $200.00 payments which
he was already obligated to make to Plaintiff, did not constitute
consideration for Plaintiff's agreement to relieve him from the payment of
any further support money.

The Court opined:

". . .we cannot see wherein the defendant gave any
consideration for the claimed agreement that he would not
have to pay any future support money. That i s , he neither
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gave anything of value, nor suffered any legal detriment
for that promise. Under the decree he was already
obligated to make the payments of $200.00 per month. Such
an agreement to do that which one is already required to do
does not constitute consideration for a new promise." [Id.
at 143]
~
Even i f Stangl had some colorable defense to enforcement of the
Guaranty so that his l i a b i l i t y on the Guaranty was doubtful and disputed,
Stangl s t i l l gave no consideration because i f Stangl can recover on the
indorsement he unilaterally improved his position rather than suffering any
legal detriment or conferring on Guardian any legal benefit.
As of the May 1981 transaction, Guardian had a claim against
Stangl on the Guaranty which at the very least represented a serious
l i a b i l i t y to Stangl.

Assuming for purposes of argument that Stangl's view

of the law is correct with respect to Guardian's l i a b i l i t y on its
indorsement, by entering into the transaction with Guardian he completely
extinguished any l i a b i l i t y on the Guaranty.

Further, Guardian was

immediately liable to Stangl on its indorsement of the original Note for an
amount in excess of Stangl1s l i a b i l i t y on the new Note.

Consequently,

the net effect of the transaction was to immediately erase any l i a b i l i t y of
Stangl to Guardian and to immediately create a substantial debt from
Guardian to Stangl.

Further, because the original Note provided for

interest at a higher rate than the new Note, Guardian's l i a b i l i t y to Stangl

6

Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-501 (4), i f Guardian's
indorsement is otherwise enforceable, Stangl had no obligation to
attempt to collect the original Note from any other party before
demanding payment from Guardian and Guardian was immediately liable on
its indorsement.
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would continue increasing as time passed.

Simply put, Stangl did not intend

to nor did he suffer any legal detriment or confer any legal benefit on
Guardian.
E.

Stangl Cannot Hold Guardian Liable On Its Indorsement

Because He Did Not Act In Good Faith.
Under the Commercial Code, every contract or duty imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
Annotated, Sec. 70A-1-203.

Utah Code

"Good faith" is defined by the Code to mean

"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
Annotated, Sec. 70A-1-201 (19).

Utah Code

Where a party to a contract fails to act in

good faith he cannot enforce the specific provisions of the contract which
are affected by his lack of good faith.

See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v.

McNabb, 381 F.Supp. 181 (D. Tenn. 1974); Eckstein v. Cummins, 321 N.E.2d 897
(Oh. 1974).
Stangl's conduct in the present transaction didn't even
approach a standard of good faith under any definition.

At the very time he

was entering into a transaction designed to lead Guardian to believe he
would pay his obligation, Stangl secretly intended to evade that obligation
all together.

The Commercial Code was not intended to reward bad faith, no

matter how cleverly disguised.
III.

GUARDIAN SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES.

Both the new Note and the Guaranty provide for attorneys1 fees to
be awarded Guardian in the event of legal action.

Consequently, Guardian

should be awarded its attorneys1 fees incurred both in the Court below and
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on appeal i f this Court reverses the District Court's Judgment and directs
that Judgment be entered in favor of Guardian.

Management Services v.

Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406 (Ut. 1980).
CONCLUSION
Stangl played an ingenious "shell game" with Guardian.

I f Stangl's

position is correct, he strolled into Guardian's office in May of 1981 owing
Guardian in excess of $130,000 and walked out a few minutes later not only
being free of debt to Guardian but with Guardian actually owing him money,
all the while making Guardian believe he had agreed to pay his obligation
like a good, honest businessman.
The District Court reluctantly concluded that i t could not deny
Stangl the fruits of his charade even though the result was "so grossly
unfair".

However, the governing principles behind the Commercial Code and

contractual relations in general do not sanction the absurd, illusory and
inequitable result for which Stangl contends.

Whether this case is viewed

from the standpoint of the technical effect of Guardian's indorsement of the
original Note or viewed from the standpoint of the enforceability of that
indorsement, Stangl is not entitled to evade his obligation which now stands
at over $200,000.
There can be no doubt that Stangl led Guardian to believe that by
executing the new Note in the May 1981 transaction, he was agreeing to pay
his obligation to Guardian strictly in accordance with the terms of that
Note, and that Stangl knew that was the result Guardian intended from the
transaction.

I t is respectfully submitted that for the reasons hereinabove

set forth, this Court should hold that this result is precisely what the
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transaction did in fact accomplish and that the Judgment on the original
Note in favor of Stangl should be reversed with directions to enter Judgment
in favor of Guardian together with reasonable attorneys1 fees.
In this regard, Guardian submits that for complete justice to be
done in this case, the amount of the Judgment in favor of Guardian should be
the full balance of the new Note without any credit for the amount of
damages awarded against the Third-Party Defendants on condition that any
amounts collected by Guardian over and above what Guardian is now out of
pocket be paid directly to the Third-Party Defendants to reimburse them for
what they have paid Guardian.

I f this Court declines to so rule, then

Judgment should be entered in favor of Guardian for the remaining balance of
the new Note after crediting the payment from the Third-Party Defendants.
DATED this

ff^fay

of October, 1984.
BURBIDGE&IMITCHELL
ST^IEN B. MlTXlm
Attorneys for Appellant
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